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Look Who's Extrapolating: A Reply to
Hoffmannt
VALERIE WEST*
JEFFREY FAGAN"
JAMES S. LIEBMAN-
In late March, a reporter called with news of a pirated copy of Professor Joseph
Hoffinann's soon-to-be-published "attack" on our study, A Broken System: Error
Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995. Did we care to comment?2 Obtaining our own
copyrevealed that ProfessorHoffmann's fusillade missed its mark (he misstates what
we did) and boomeranged (his mischaracterizations of our analysis accurately
describe his own). We do care to comment, and Hoffmann and the Indiana Law
Journal have graciously let us do so.
Hoffmann's main claim is that we "extrapolated" the 68% rate of reversible error
we reported for capital verdicts reviewed during the twenty-three-year study period.'
We did no such thing. But he did. His 40% counterstatistic is an "extrapolation" in
the purest sense, which proceeds from deflationary assumptions that are factually
wrong.
Every year nearly 300 death sentences roll off the production lines in states with
the penalty.4 Most are inspected on state direct appeal, state postconviction review,
and federal habeas.5 On average, it takes about twelve years for death sentences to
pass all three inspections-if they dopass.6 Most don't.7 When so many capital cases
are awaiting final inspection at any given time, how should error rates be calculated?
Consider an analogous production line. Suppose, hypothetically, Ford Explorers
made at a particular plant are said to pose an unreasonable risk of injury or death.
Investigators want to know how often Explorers fail the plant's three-stage safety
inspection, requiring them to be reworked or scrapped. The plant made 5760
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* Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Sociology, New York University.
** Professor of Law, Columbia Law School, and Professor of Public Health, Joseph L.
Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University.
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1. James S. Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan & Valerie West, A Broken System: Error Rates in
Capital Cases, 1973-1995, at http://www.law.columbia.edu/instructionalservices/liebman/
liebman final.pdf (June 2000) [hereinafter A Broken System], reprinted in part in James S.
Liebman et al., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995, 78 TEX. L. REV.
1839 (2000) [hereinafter Capital Attrition].
2. See Ann Woolner, How Much Error Is Tolerable in Death Cases, Bloomberg News
Service, at http:llquote.bloomberg.com/fgcgi.cgiptitle=Ann%20Woolner&touch=l&sl=
woolner&tp=ad-topright bbco&T=markets-fggicontent99.ht&s2=blk&bt=blk&s
=AOruLRBWLSG93IEI I (Mar. 23,2001).
3. See Joseph L. Hoffmann, Violence and the Truth, 76 IND. L.J. 939, 945-46 (2001).
4. See James S. Liebman, The Overproduction ofDeath, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030,2065
(2000) [hereinafter Overproduction of Death].
5. See A Broken System, supra note 1, at 19-22.
6. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BULLETIN: CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 1999 (2000), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/cp99.htm.
7. See Capital Attrition, supra note 1, at 1851.
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Explorers over twenty-three months. 1182 are awaiting a first inspection. The
remaining 4578 got that inspection, which 41% (1885) flunked and were sent back.
Of the remaining 2693 (4578-1885) getting a second inspection, 10% (255) failed.
Of the remaining 2438, 599 received a third inspection (1839 are still awaiting
review), and 40% (237) flunked. What is the plant's error rate?
That rate is a composite of the error rates revealed at each inspection stage during
the relevant period. For every hundred vehicles actually inspected at the first stage,
forty-one failed and fifty-nine passed. For every fifty-nine inspected at the second
stage, an additional 10%, or six, failed and fifty-three, passed. For every fifty-three
reviewed at the third and final stage, 40%, or twenty-one failed, and thirty-two
passed. So, for every hundred vehicles actually going through the inspection process
and either being rejected or passed on to market, sixty-eight were rejected and thirty-
two were approved: a 68% error rate. This error rate (1) uses all available
information, counting the full results of every inspection that actually occurred, and
(2) does not extrapolate, making no assumption about inspections that have not yet
occurred.
If you were an anti-SUV crusader, you might propose a different rate, namely; the
proportion ofvehicles failing allfinal inspections. Here, the number inspected is 1885
(failing the first inspection and being sent back) + 255 (failing the second inspection)
+ 599 (which received a third and final inspection) = 2739. The number failing is
1885 + 255 + 237 (the last is the number failing the third inspection) = 2377. The fail
rate is 2377/2739, or 80%. The problem with this approach is that it doesn't use all
available information about actual inspection results. Byassuminga 100% failure rate
at both the first inspection (1885/1885) and the second (255/255), it misleadingly
ignores the actual results of those inspections-respectively, a 40% and 10% failure
rate. (This approach does provide useful information: the ratio of vehicles entering
the inspection process that made it to market. But that is not an error rate.)
If you were the plant manager, with your job on the line, you might try to fudge in
the opposite direction, by computing the ratio of all vehicles the plant made (5760)
that failed inspection (1885 + 255 + 237 = 2377), about 40% (2377/5760). The
problem here is revealed by what the 40% rate says about how many vehiclespassed
inspection: 3383 (5760-2377), or about 60%. That number is the sum of a thousand-
plus vehicles that did not even reach the first inspection, plus nearly 2000 vehicles
that failed to complete the other two inspections, plus 362 vehicles that passed all
three. The 40% rate thus is an extrapolation based on an assumption that thousands
of vehicles passed (and none failed) a plethora of inspections that never occurred.
Moreover, assuming a 100% pass rate for uninspected vehicles is obviously absurd,
given how many vehicles made at the same plant in the same period were inspected
andflunked-at rates of 41%, 10%, and 40% in the successive stages, and 68%
overall. Why make a grossly inaccurate and deflationary assumption unless there is
something to hide? (And what good is hiding when, even after faulty extrapolation,
the fail rate is still 40%?)
This Ford plant is made up. But the numbers aren't. They are the actual, total
number of death verdicts pronounced in the United States during our twenty-three-
year study period and the number reversed and sent back at each stage of the review
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process Contrary to Hoffmann's claim, they are not "samples." They are the entire
universe of cases during the period.
The three proposed reversal rates also are real. 88% is the error rate that critics of
the death penalty compute from our study.' As the analysis above indicates, that rate
is suspect because it suppresses the crucial information that some cases awaiting later
stages of review were affirmed at earlier stages. To that extent, the measure is
misleading, and we have rejected it.
The 40% proposed rate is Hoffmann's."° The problem with this figure is that it is
an extrapolation based on two assumptions: (1) that thousands of court reviews that
in fact have not occurred, have occurred and (2) that all resulted in affirmances. The
first assumption is false. The second assumption-a 0% reversal rate for not-yet-
completed court reviews-is (with all due respect) absurd: The same appellate courts
reviewing thousands of death sentences imposed by the same trial courts in the same
years had a 41% reversal rate at the first stage, a 10% reversal rate for the remaining
cases reviewed at the second stage, and a 40% reversal rate for the remaining cases
reviewed at the third stage, for an overall error rate of 68%." Because Hoffmann's
figure is an estimate based on plainly wrong assumptions about undecided cases, we
rejected it. (It does show, however, that even with absurdly deflationary assumptions,
the error rate is still depressingly high.)
The error rate is 68%. That rate counts all actual outcomes at all stages (no
sampling; no data suppression), and only actual outcomes (no extrapolation), of court
decisions reviewing every death sentence imposed and inspected during the twenty-
three-year study period. It accounts for the condition that Hoffmann correctly notes
must be the lynchpin of any method of calculating error-that "during the study
period many of the cases... had been reviewed only on direct appeal, but not on state
postconviction or federal habeas"' 2--but that he then ignores in his own calculation. 3
8. See A Broken System, supra note 1, at 29-33.
9. Telephone Interview with Richard Dieter, Director, Death Penalty Information Center
(Sept. 6, 2000).
10. Hoffmann, supra note 3, at 946.
11. See A Broken System, supra note 1, at 29-33.
12. Hoffmann, supra note 3, at 945.
13. In his rejoinder, Hoffmann admits our 68% figure shows what actually happened to
verdicts that were finally reviewed during the study period. See Joseph L. Hoffmann, A Brief
Response to Liebman, Fagan, and West, 76 IND. L.J. 957, 957 (2001). This leads him to
redefine his 40% figure, not as an alternative to our 68%, but as an admitted extrapolation from
the answer to a counterfactual question about the many 1973-95 verdicts that got stuck in the
system and were not reviewed in the period: "How many of the as-yet-unreviewed cases would
be reversed, if they were completely reviewed?" Id. (emphasis in original). Noting that those
results cannot actually be counted, Hoffmann makes an avowedly "absurd" guess-that all"as-
yet-unreviewed" cases "would be" affirmed. See id. Then adding his made-up 0% reversal rate
for undecided cases to the actual 68% rate for decided cases, he conjures up a 40% rate for the
two sets of cases combined and claims that the combined rate is between 40% and 68%. See
id. But if you were coaching the Indiana Pacers basketball team, which, say, had missed 68%
of its free throws in the regular season, would you plan for the playoffs based on the avowedly
absurd assumption that the team would make all its "as-yet-unattempted" foul shots? Or, would
you plan for the team's miss rate to be about what it was in the past, give or take a little? And,
if projecting a 40% miss rate for the entire season ("depressing" as that still admittedly would
2001]
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Hoffmann's second criticism also misdescribes A Broken System. Our side study
of the reasons for and retrial results of state postconviction reversals found that (1)
80% of the violations based on which relief was granted required proof of at least a
reasonable probability that, but for the violation, the substantive outcome at the guilt
or sentencing phase would have been different and (2) 82% of those reversals led, on
retrial, to an outcome less than death, including 7% leading to acquittals. 4 A Broken
System nowhere claims that these bases for relief and retrial results are anything other
than what they are: the reasons for, and retrial outcomes of, all actual reversals at the
state postconviction stage during the study period. Hoffmann admits this is clear "[i]f
you read the study carefully. '" s It also is clear if you just read the study.6
Hoffmann is concerned that this finding not be extended to the other review stages
where, he assumes-based on no data, a sample of zero-that reversals are for merely
"technical" violations. '7 We will soon publish findings that the bases for relief at the
third, federal habeas, stage are very like those at the state postconviction stage,
belying Hoffmann's "technicalities" assumption as to habeas.
We also question that assumption when applied to state direct appeal, where data
are not available. Why assume elected state supreme court justices reverse capital
verdicts for less serious, more frivolous reasons than unelected federal habeas
judges? Why assume state supreme courts ignore the harmless error rule barring
reversals based on violations with no effect on the substantive outcome?' All
available evidence suggests those courts overuse the rule to deny relief---as in the
Anthony Porter miscarriage that Hoffmann himself decries.2" Is it sensible to prefer
be) is too reckless when it's just a game at stake, how helpful is it when life is in the balance?
14. See Capital Attrition, supra note 1, at 1850, 1852.
15. Hoffmann, supra note 3, at 946.
16. See, e.g., A Broken System, supra note 1, at ii (discussing "[t]he most common
errors-prompting amajority ofreversals at the statepost-conviction stage," and reporting that
"82% of the people whose capital judgments were overturned by state post-conviction courts
due to serious error were found to deserve a sentence less than death when the errors were
cured on retrial; 7% were found to be innocent of the capital crime" (emphasis added, other
emphasis omitted)); id. at 5 (same); Capital Attrition, supra note 1, at 1850, 1852.
17. See Hoffinann, supra note 3, at 947.
18. See, e.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (barring reversal of conviction
in death-penalty case even though prosecutor's argument and trial judge's jury instructions
unconstitutionally directed the jury to draw in favor of prosecution all inferences from
defendants' failure to testify if the state could show beyond a reasonable doubt that the
"constitutionally forbidden statements" did not influence defendants' convictions).
19. See Overproduction of Death, supra note 4, at 2128-29 & n.239 (listing sources).
20. Despite Anthony Porter's innocence, later proven by intrepid undergraduate students
as ajoumalism project, see Hoffmann, supra note 3, at 948 & n.48, a full complement of state
and federal courts had upheld his conviction and death sentence, holding that violations that
may have occurred at his trial should be overlooked, as harmless and nonprejudicial, because
"the evidence against the defendant was overwhelming." Illinois v. Porter, 489 N.E.2d 1329,
1337 (Il1. 1986) (denying direct appeal), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 898 (1986); see also Illinois
v. Porter, 647 N.E.2d 872, 975 (111. 1995) (affirming denial of state postconviction relief,
although Porter's trial lawyer was incompetent, because the "considerable" evidence against
Porter prevented him from showing "prejudice"); United States ex rel. Porter v. Warden
Pontiac Correctional Ctr., No. 95-C-41 11, 1996 WL 167340 (N.D. I1. Apr. 4, 1996) (same),
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postconviction review, which Hoffinann concedes finds truly serious error, to state
direct appeal on the assumed ground that state supreme court justices reverse for the
heck of it? Why not instead assume that the state supreme court decisions analyzed
in our state postconviction study fairly suggest how clear and serious error must be
before the same courts will reverse capital verdicts on direct appeal? Or why not
assume, as is usually true, that initial inspections find the worst, most glaring errors,
leaving more subtle flaws for later inspections? Where everything we actually
know-including from our state postconviction study-belies Hoffmann's.
assumption that state supreme courts routinely reverse capital verdicts on
"technicalities," isn'tit fairto ask for some representative examples? Hoffmann gives
none.
2 1
Finally, Hoffmann complains that our study "identified only twenty-two cases
nationwide" in which innocent men and women on death row were subsequently
acquitted, and that "many more cases involved a defendant who was guilty of the
capital crime, but was [merely?] undeserving of the death penalty."' In fact, since the
deathpenalty was reinstated, ninety-five death-row inmates have been acquitted-just
affd sub nom. Porter v. Gramley, 112 F.3d 1308 (7th Cir. 1997), reh 'g denied, 122 F.3d 351
(7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1093 (1998), reh'g deniedsub nom. Porterv. Gilmore,
523 U.S. 1042 (1998).
21. Hoffmann claims that some reversible errors are too piddling to bear on the reliability
of the conviction or death sentence. We asked him to cite some real reversals that illustrate his
point. He doesn't. Instead, his rejoinder poses a hypothetical "loosely based on the real case
of Mills v. Maryland, in which the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated thejury instructions... that
were routinely used with respect to mitigating circumstances in Maryland capital cases, based
on the existence of a 'substantial risk' . . . that the jury... might have been... misled."
Hoffmann, supra note 13, at 958 n.8 (citation omitted) (quoting Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S.
367, 381 (1988)). "Loose[" is right. Hoffmann assumes that "ninety out of a hundred cases
would have come out the same way even without the challenged instruction" because "most
of the... defendants... were... deserving of a death sentence." Id. We, again, have actual
data on retrial outcomes at the state postconviction stage, where most Mills reversals probably
occurred. In fact, 75% of the inmates whose death sentences were reversed based on Mills at
that stage were found on retrial before a properly instructed jury (or in one case on clemency)
to be undeserving of a death sentence. See A Broken System, supra note 1, at C-29 to C-30.
Three-fourths of the time, the error meant the difference between life and death-hardly
piddling.
Looser still is Hoffmann's assumption that courts found reversible error-the only error
serious enough to be counted in our study-in all seventy or hundred cases the press initially
thought Mills might affect. He forgets that courts often fail to grant relief on Mills claims for
reasons that show why reversible error (the kind found in 68% of the death verdicts reviewed
during the study period) is serious error-error whose cure on retrial usually changes the
outcome. Some Mills claims were not preserved at trial or on appeal; others were mooted by
reversals due to different violations; and still others were found nonprejudicial because the
defendant could not show a "substantial risk" that the bad instruction misled the jury.
Hoffmann accepts our underlying policy conclusions but quibbles with our numbers. He
believes precision matters. It does. That's why we prefer actual counts of real events to
demonstrably inaccurate assumptions and hypotheticals.
22. Hoffinann, supra note 3, at 947.
2001]
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under one for everyseven executed.' More fundamentally, Hoffinann's indifference
to faulty verdicts sentencing people to die for acts for which death is not a legal
punishment, as long as they committed some crime, is contrary to the usual
assumption that unreliable death sentences are matters of utmost concern.24 The
defects in Professor Hoffmann's analysis are illustrated by putting his words in the
mouth of our hypothetical plant manager:
So what if our inspectors found 68% of our cars too flawed to let on the
road? And what if 82% of the cars flunking our second inspection had to be
scrapped instead of fixed? Only twenty-two (or was it ninety-five?) actually
risked killing test drivers. Many others only endangered people who break the
law. And some of the rest (sorry, I can't give examples) are due to overregulating
and overlitigating, which is why we pay inspectors to reject cars on
technicalities. As for the 82% scrap rate, that was only for a small set of cars
where we know what happened. (Don't ask me why I think other rejected cars
do better.) And they were scrapped because our supervisors thought they weren't
worth fixing. Why trust them?'
In the end, Hoffmann agrees that "the current system remains plagued by examples
of overzealous police and prosecutors, inadequate defense lawyers, and strained
resources," that "substantively unjust outcomes [occur] in ... too many" cases, and
that "prosecutors ... [should] join with defense attorneys in searching for, and
correcting, such error." 6 But despite this common ground, it is important that
Hoffmann not (to paraphrase him) "greatly [under]stat[e] the statistical case about
substantive injustice in death-penalty cases."'27
23. Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Innocence and the Death Penalty, at http:/lwww.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/innoe.html (last visited May 14, 2001).
24. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 405 (1993) ("We have.., held that the
Eighth Amendment requires increased reliability of the process by which capital punishment
may be imposed." (citing McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990), Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978))); see also James
S. Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan & Valerie West, Death Matters: A Reply to Latzer and Cauthen, 84
JUDICATURE 72 (2000); Jeffrey Fagan, James S. Liebman & Valerie West, Death Is the Whole
Ball Game, 84 JUDICATURE 144 (2000).
25. See Hoffmann, supra note 3, at 946-47.
26. Id. at 948, 949.
27. Id. at 948.
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